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Protocol on electoral violence for candidates in the electoral processes



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Introduction

This protocol has been developed by the Laboratorio Electoral with the support of the British Embassy in México as part of an effort to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of electoral violence and the importance of addressing its impact on the conduct of electoral processes in which judges will be elected throughout the country. The ultimate goal is for both the report and the protocol, resulting from this collaboration, to contribute to the creation and refinement of tools that allow for a comprehensive response to this phenomenon.

Electoral violence is a problem that the Laboratorio has been studying since 2018, and the findings allow us to conclude that it has become inherent to electoral processes, with an imperfect response from authorities and a vulnerability among candidates. We also observed this vulnerability in judicial elections, where candidates—for the most part—lack party structures, political knowledge, and familiarity with the electoral system, facing greater asymmetric risks from pressure groups seeking to co-opt the democratic model.

This protocol is designed to support efforts aimed at standardizing and professionalizing the institutional response and that of the candidates to acts of political-criminal violence in México. This is achieved through a review of regulatory frameworks, resolutions of the General Council of the National Electoral Institute (INE), protocols of the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (SSPC), and case law of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF).

This protocol is structured as an operational guide to help candidates learn about tools that enable them to fully exercise their political and electoral rights, and to provide recommendations for authorities who become aware of such incidents, detailing a critical path for activating available protection mechanisms and systematizing the technical elements for filing effective complaints.

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Regulatory Framework and Baseline Assessment

The protection of candidates is a constitutional obligation; however, the complexity of the Mexican federal system sometimes appears to dilute this responsibility across multiple levels of government. That is why it is important to recall the existing regulatory framework which, although at first glance it

may not appear to specifically legislate on this issue, does allow for the determination of jurisdictions, legal obligations, and a legal framework under which action can be taken; likewise, it is essential to review the procedure that has been in effect in recent electoral processes.

Legal Framework

The following are the articles of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (CPEUM) and secondary laws (see Annex 1) that currently empower security authorities to provide safeguards for candidates:

- **Article 21 of the CPEUM.** Public security is a function under the responsibility of the Federation, the states, and the municipalities, encompassing crime prevention, investigation, and prosecution. This article is the cornerstone of any request for protection, as it establishes the shared responsibility of the three levels of government.
- **Article 41 of the CPEUM.** It establishes the guiding principles of certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, and objectivity. The jurisprudence of the TEPJF has interpreted that widespread violence nullifies these principles, as it impedes freedom of suffrage and fairness in the electoral contest. Therefore, guaranteeing the physical safety of candidates is a precondition for the validity of the election itself.
- **General Law on Electoral Crimes (LGMDE).** It distinguishes between ordinary violence and electoral violence, when the latter is committed for electoral purposes. Thus, for example, if a candidate is beaten or assaulted to force them to withdraw from the process, two crimes are committed: bodily injury (under ordinary jurisdiction) and the exertion of pressure or interference with the conduct of the election (within the jurisdiction of the specialized prosecutor's office), which are prosecuted by the competent authorities. See Annex 2

Although electoral authorities do not have direct investigative powers regarding assaults, the legal framework grants them specific powers, particularly in the areas of coordination and management to safeguard political and electoral rights against violence, as they act as an institutional link to activate the State's protection mechanisms. This regulatory framework also encompasses the participation of the states in accordance with their state electoral laws, as they possess the constitutional authority to issue the necessary agreements to fulfill the provisions conferred upon them by their own codes, and to define all matters not reserved for the INE.

Jurisdictional Framework

The Constitution empowers federal authorities to assume jurisdiction over crimes under state jurisdiction when these are connected to federal crimes or when they involve, for example, attacks against journalists and human rights defenders. And although there is a legal debate over whether candidates should be treated with the same standard of automatic jurisdiction as journalists or human rights defenders, the reality is that the current framework could serve as a guide for addressing candidates and even pre-candidates.

During electoral processes, security management tasks (mechanisms, agreements, guidelines, etc.) fall primarily to the federal government (National Guard and SSPC), particularly the Attorney General's Office—and, where applicable, local prosecutors' offices (see Annex 3)—which theoretically simplifies the chain of command, though it increases the operational burden on federal forces.

- **State Prosecutor's Offices.** They have original jurisdiction over homicides, injuries, threats, kidnapping, extortion, and damage to another's property. The vast majority of attacks against candidates, including murders, are initially investigated here.
- **Federal Prosecutor's Office.** It has jurisdiction over federal election crimes and crimes committed by organized crime (Federal Law Against Organized Crime).

Election Response Protocols

The General Council of the INE, in compliance with rulings by the TEPJF (see Annex 4), has issued specific agreements¹ that required it to create risk maps and sign cooperation agreements with security forces. During the 2021, 2024, and 2025 electoral processes, adjusted versions of a protocol for assisting victims of electoral violence involving candidates were adopted, which included the participation of the following authorities:

¹ INE/CG60/2025

Authority	INE	SSPC	Security Agencies	Specialized Prosecutor's Office for Electoral Crimes (FISEL)
Jurisdiction of the authority	<p>The body that receives requests for protection of federal candidates (including judicial candidates).</p> <p>Acts as the Electoral Office to certify acts of violence and ensure that evidence is preserved.</p>	<p>Executive authority responsible for coordinating the protection response at the federal level.</p> <p>Receives requests forwarded by the INE, conducts risk assessments (in conjunction with the National Intelligence Center (CNI) and the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), and determines the level of protection to be assigned.</p>	<p>Provides physical escorts and perimeter security. Implements assigned protection measures (escorts, armored vehicles, patrols).</p>	<p>Attached to the FGR and responsible for investigating crimes that affect the fairness of the election.</p> <p>It investigates, among other things, voter coercion, the use of illicit resources, and political violence for electoral purposes.</p>
Role in the victim assistance process	<p>Through the Executive Secretariat and the Executive Directorate of Legal Affairs, the INE receives the request, verifies that the candidacy is registered, and immediately forwards it to the SSPC.</p>	<p>Through the security committees (an inter-institutional body comprising the SSPC, INE, the Attorney General's Office, and the armed forces), the electoral process is monitored on a daily basis.</p>	<p>Their actions are prioritized for federal candidates (President, Senate, Federal Deputies, Judiciary). For local candidates, they act only in a subsidiary capacity or in cases of extreme risk validated by the federal committee.</p>	<p>This is the channel for reporting politically motivated violence, complementing the homicide/injury investigation conducted by the local prosecutor's office.</p>

Once coordination between these authorities was established—whether through dialogue and cooperation forums or through guidelines and working agreements—the *Security Plan for Candidates* was put in place. Although it underwent adjustments in each election, it became the basis for the formal procedure through which the Mexican government allocates protection resources to individuals who, after meeting the legal requirements, are recognized as candidates in an electoral process. This procedure has been standardized for the 2024–2025 election cycle and is strictly applied to judicial and federal candidacies:

■ **Step 1: Initiation of the Application**

The aspirant or candidate must draft a formal letter addressed to the Executive Secretariat of the INE.

- Full name and position for which they are running.
- Political party or indication of being an independent/judicial candidate.
- Direct contact information and a security contact (24/7 phone number).

- Detailed description of why protection is being requested (threats received, previous incidents, local context).

If the request is submitted to a Local or District Board, or even to the National Guard, they are legally obligated to forward it immediately, within a maximum of 12 hours, to the INE's central offices.

■ **Step 2: Institutional Processing (INE -> SSPC)**

The INE verifies the candidate's current registration and forwards the request via secure electronic means to the SSPC. This step is administrative and must occur within a maximum of 12 hours (usually immediately given the urgency). Similarly, it must notify local electoral authorities and decentralized bodies of the request and the potential risk of violent incidents.

■ **Step 3: Risk Analysis (Federal Intelligence)**

The SSPC refers the case to the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the National Guard, and SEDENA. A "risk assessment" is conducted based on:

- Prior intelligence (risk maps).
- History of violence against the candidate.
- The applicant's level of competition and political profile.

■ **Step 4: Assignment and Notification**

The SSPC:

- Based on the available information and on a preliminary basis, determines the risk level (High, Medium, Low; see Annex 5) and notifies the INE of the result.
- The INE officially notifies the candidate and the party (if applicable).
- The assigned security force (GN/SEDENA) contacts the candidate operationally to initiate the protocol.

This protection scheme has shown critical limitations, as although it establishes a formal application process, it operates under a centralized and bureaucratic logic with serious consequences. That is why it is important to specifically highlight its shortcomings and their impacts on the security of the candidates:

Element	Latest version of protocol ²	Operational shortcoming	Impact on security
Entities authorized to request protection	Currently, only individuals legally recognized as candidates may request protection.	Recognition as candidates occurs in the final 90 or 60 days of the electoral process.	Vulnerability of pre-candidates and aspirants during all preliminary stages and delays in taking precautions.
Start of the application process	At the request of the candidates.	It is a reactive process that places the responsibility on the victim and minimizes the importance of anticipating risky situations or locations.	Vulnerability of candidates and aspirants in high-risk areas and fostering a sense of lack of state protection.
Submission of the protection request	Centralized at the INE/OPLS via official correspondence	Slow and difficult to access for candidates in rural areas or in "silent" zones.	Delay in the implementation of measures (risk latency).
Analysis of each case	Ruling by the National Guard/CNI based on verified threats.	Ignores contextual analysis, possible pre-existing conflicts, and risk zones.	Lack of protection for candidates without explicit threats but in risk zones.
Coverage of candidates	Federal priority (Presidency, Congress) and local, especially in gubernatorial races.	Neglect of the municipal level, where almost all cases of violence occur.	High fatality rates in mayoral and city council races, and an increasing climate of impunity.
Judicial	The PEEPJF 2024-2025 protocol is in its early stages.	Lack of understanding of the specific risks associated with judicial candidacies.	Vulnerability of judges to reprisals from organized crime or actors dissatisfied with their decisions.
Protection approach	Police/Military in an escort operation.	Lack of a preventive social approach and comprehensive reparations.	Repetition of violence due to impunity.
Costs	In interviews, it has become evident that the responsibility for covering the costs of assigning a protection unit falls on the victim.	It is assumed that the victim has a certain level of purchasing power and economic capacity, without clarity regarding the costs.	Victims are more vulnerable if their purchasing power or financial capacity is lower.
Lack of transparency	The protocol does not provide for a mechanism to monitor the trial or legal case.	Legal uncertainty and lack of information provided to the victim regarding the investigation of their case.	Increased sense of impunity and disengagement from political life.

Having clarity on the current flow of complaints and actions, as well as their main shortcomings, sheds light on the system's needs and the types of documentary sources that must be reviewed to ensure a better methodology for addressing the needs of candidates and key actors.

² INE-SSPC 2024

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Results of the Document Review

For the creation and drafting of this proposed protocol, approximately 100 sources were reviewed that analyze the phenomenon of electoral violence and political violence, propose response protocols, issue recommendations, examine the Mexican case, and review experiences in other countries. As a result, we know that the main conclusion is that electoral violence is not an end in itself, but a means defined by operational criteria that can be summarized in four points: 1) the motive (to influence the outcome or secure the position), 2) the timing (pre-election and during the process to purge candidates, post-election to challenge the results), 3) the actors (state, criminal, partisan), and 4) the targets (human or infrastructure).

Below is a set of best practices organized

around the themes of response and prevention. These are identified primarily based on international experiences in the American Friends Service Committee³, and on the work carried out by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in México in coordination with the British Embassy in México to investigate crimes committed against human rights defenders and journalists⁴. Additionally, this analysis is supplemented by the experience of other organizations such as Amnesty International, International IDEA, the National Protection Unit (UNP), and the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) in Colombia, Creatives Associates International, the National Democratic Institute, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, and dozens of academic articles.

■ *Prevention*

For an effective prevention strategy, comparative experience combines short- and long-term actions. Additionally, it was found that coordination and cooperation among key actors are essential so that responsibility and commitment to non-violence do not rest exclusively with electoral authorities but also with citizens, civil society, political parties, and other actors.

³ <https://afsc.org/sites/default/files/documents/Electoral-violence-report-web-version.pdf>

⁴ https://hchr.org.mx/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/InformeONUDH_BuenasPracticasYDesafios_web.pdf

Analysis of these sources highlights the importance of the State being responsible for ensuring clear rules, security, civic education, dispute resolution mechanisms, and effective law enforcement. This underscores the need for a thorough analysis prior to developing any prevention protocol or strategy, which must include:

- **Structural causes of electoral violence.** These may arise, for example, when the electoral system is based on patronage, which encourages supporters to use violence to protect their resources, or in cases where the electoral system promotes a “winner-takes-all” mechanism that raises the cost of losing elections and hinders access to power. Other potential structural problems arise from the capture of the state by corrupt dynamics, including the diversion of resources and funding to certain political forces, which fosters unfair competition. For this reason, the sources consulted call for an examination of any structural weaknesses that may exist so that, with an adequate assessment, they can be properly addressed.
- **Institutional causes of electoral violence.** These may stem from a lack of reliable legal channels for conflict resolution or for gaining access to power, which can push actors to seek violent means of resolution; they may also arise when those who hold public office or commit acts of violence are able to evade oversight and monitoring bodies or easily avoid facing consequences for their actions.
- **Previous conflicts and the context in which electoral processes take place.** In this regard, some protocols call for assessing whether electoral violence might be an extension of existing social or territorial conflicts; others highlight the importance of conducting prior geographic mapping of incidents and high-risk areas to gain a clear picture of the phenomenon; and still others emphasize the need for preliminary mapping of the key actors involved in the phenomenon and the characteristics of the type of violence observed.
 - This would allow for an assessment of the environment in which electoral processes will take place, enabling candidates to conduct a proper risk analysis and ensuring that the measures adopted are proportionate to the context in which the phenomenon occurs.
 - It would also be useful at this point to conduct a differentiated analysis between urban, suburban, and rural areas and the level of state presence in certain areas to determine the level of vulnerability of the candidates and key actors.

These three points are the most frequently mentioned in the analyzed materials. However, before proceeding to the second section, it is worth mentioning two points that, although not as widely incorporated by the authors consulted, we consider to play a fundamental role in the Mexican context:

- **Civic education:** Although the state is responsible for generating, through the authorities designated for this purpose, civic education campaigns and efforts to promote democratic values, these actions can and should be promoted in conjunction with civil society and political parties/groups to reach more people, incorporate different approaches, and, above all, develop collective networks of local empowerment for the prevention, reporting, and response to incidents related to electoral violence.
- **Self-protection measures:** In addition to the efforts that the State, electoral authorities, and their coordinating bodies must undertake, it is also important to promote a series of preventive habits or actions among potential victims. These measures should focus on reducing the predictability of their actions, strengthening security and vigilance in their physical and digital environments, and establishing internal protocols in the event of potential attacks.
- **Special attention to vulnerable groups:** Once the contextual analyses have been conducted and vulnerability levels identified, it is important to ensure that the strategies developed incorporate a cross-cutting approach that addresses the specific forms of violence suffered by historically vulnerable groups.

Once the most important points addressed in the electoral violence prevention pillar have been analyzed—points that are especially important for adopting strategic prevention measures to reduce the reactive response of institutions—it becomes important to review the second pillar, concerning the response to electoral violence. This pillar will focus on best practices adopted by different countries and on the importance of promoting institutional and legal regulation to ensure that the measures adopted to provide redress to victims are not only sufficient but also guarantee non-repetition.

■ *Response*

The phenomenon of electoral violence, like any other that directly undermines the exercise or full enjoyment of human rights, demands immediate, specialized, and coordinated responses that investigate and punish violent acts, protect and provide redress to victims, and guarantee non-repetition of the events. This area falls almost exclusively under the responsibility of state authorities, particularly prosecutors' offices, public security institutions, their coordination with electoral authorities, and judicial authorities. Regarding this last point, it is worth noting that, in the Mexican context, judicial authorities can become targets of attacks related to electoral violence and will ultimately be the ones to determine the outcome of investigations conducted by other competent authorities in the matter. To promote best practices for addressing the phenomenon of electoral violence, the sources consulted yielded interesting findings, which can be summarized in the following points:

- **Immediate protection.** The greatest consensus among the sources consulted is the importance of competent authorities adopting precautionary and/or protective measures in the face of any type of aggression. In this regard, the sources emphasize the need to accurately assess the severity of the reported attack and to take into account that, in some cases, the mere creation of a violent atmosphere can worsen the context in which an electoral process unfolds; therefore, the measures adopted must take this into consideration to de-escalate the threat.
- **Investigation and legal case building.** As mentioned in the previous section, it is important at this stage to take into account institutional or structural failures and to address potential legal loopholes or those that foster a climate of impunity in cases of violence. Therefore, it is essential that, in the face of any type of aggression, a thorough and effective investigation be conducted into the elements related to the aggression to reconstruct the facts, detect patterns of behavior, identify possible perpetrators and/or masterminds, and ensure the collection of evidence to be included in the case file. It will also be important here to consider the stage of the electoral process at which the aggression occurs, as well as to request a penalty proportional to the type of violent event in question.
 - One point that should be clear at this stage is the reporting process for cases of electoral violence, as ambiguity regarding jurisdiction, a lack of legislation, or other variables can undermine the legitimacy and trust in both the investigation and the ruling resulting from the case.
- **Institutional coordination.** The effectiveness with which cases are handled—and even the speed with which they are resolved—will also depend on effective coordination among all relevant authorities, who, beyond the clarity of the flowchart, must be capable not only of cooperating but also of avoiding redundancy or uncertainty in decision-making.
 - All sources consulted agree on the need for roundtables or at least spaces for dialogue among the authorities responsible for these response strategies to facilitate accountability, the effective exchange of information, the proper implementation of protocols, and to ensure redress for the victim.
 - Additionally, an important point identified was the definition of roles and responsibilities for political parties or groups—not only as the primary points of contact between candidates and authorities, but also as guarantors of safe spaces for candidates, along with clear administrative, legal, and criminal sanctions in the event of failure to respect the latter.

Although these two areas were the primary focus of the sources consulted, the contributions regarding a potential area—which in some cases was incorporated into prevention and in others into the response to electoral violence—remained in the limbo of this research: reparations. As one might expect, it is impossible to speak of efforts to curb electoral violence when there is a climate of impunity or an inability to punish the perpetrators of electoral violence.

■ *Reparation*

The aforementioned areas, as well as the efforts they require, must culminate in a process of reparation that is proportionate, reliable, and transparent for victims, while simultaneously serving to deter the commission of electoral violence and to consolidate democratic processes where violent means have no place. This seems to be a particularly demanding task in a phase that is sometimes overlooked but is vital for democracy to maintain its deliberative character in peaceful environments.

In that sense, although there is not much clarity regarding the measures to be adopted in this area, the interviews we have conducted with both victims of electoral violence and civil society organizations shed light on three fundamental aspects to consider at this stage:

- **Transparency of the process.** At this stage, it is essential that there be open, accessible, and timely communication with the victim and/or their family members or legal representatives, not only regarding the status of their case but also regarding the final decisions made in this regard. Uncertainty and lack of information completely undermine trust not only in the rule of law but in the very essence of democracy and its institutions.
- **Effective access to justice.** It is necessary to ensure the legal system's capacity to effectively address and resolve any case of aggression in order to reduce the perception of impunity. Decisions made regarding any case must encourage the reduction of any type of aggression against candidates and individuals directly involved in the electoral process and, above all, must not, under any circumstances, seek to normalize or minimize the problem.
- **Learning.** The cycle of electoral violence ends not only when a public sentence proportionate to the offense is handed down, but when that sentence allows for the adoption—or requires the adoption—of measures of reparation and non-repetition. These measures must focus on strengthening efforts to promote a culture of peace, strengthening prevention and response protocols, as well as the competent authorities' professional and operational capacities, so that the victims' experience does not become a mere anecdote, but rather lessons and tools to strengthen democracy.

This issue becomes particularly problematic when one considers that, starting in 2025 in México, judges, ministers, and magistrates across the country will be subject to the political arena and may become targets of attacks during the electoral processes in which they participate. As mentioned in previous sections, individuals who may have been victims of electoral violence could eventually be the ones responsible for issuing the rulings that bring a case of aggression to a close. The consequences of this remain unknown, but we do not see how, in the short term, internal and external pressures on judges to make one decision or another can be

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Recommendations for the Authorities

Based on the preceding analysis, the following series of recommendations are issued for adoption in preparation for the upcoming electoral process, organized by key stages.

Preparation for the electoral process

The objective at this stage will be to fortify institutions and clearly define the responsibilities of the authorities involved so that coordination is much more efficient, avoiding ambiguities and placing victims at the center.

— Risk mapping

To implement a preventive intelligence strategy, it is necessary to conduct a risk mapping exercise using information that civil society organizations have made public over the years, supplemented by monitoring by security authorities, and cross-referenced with agreements and rulings by judicial authorities regarding locations where incidents have occurred during electoral processes. To this end, it is essential to:

- **Incident monitoring:** integration of data (homicides, attacks on officials, cash flow) to create a *Risk Map*.
 - This map can be made publicly available to future candidates or political parties, as its content would enable informed decision-making in future stages of the electoral process.
 - If it is decided not to make it public, it remains equally important that it be sent and shared by all relevant authorities.
- **Context analysis:** identifying latent social, economic, or political conflicts that could trigger electoral violence in certain areas.
 - Incorporate a strategy to promote peace and build bridges of dialogue among key stakeholders to seek alternative avenues for resolution and assign roles and responsibilities to these stakeholders not only to prevent violence but also to ensure subsequent accountability.

■ Definition of responsibilities

It is important not only to prevent municipal law enforcement agencies from becoming overwhelmed, but also to ensure that federal authorities have the capacity and resources to act in a timely manner:

■ Federal Government (National Guard / SEDENA):

- *Jurisdiction:* federal crimes, organized crime, and protection of candidates for the Presidency, state governorships, the Federal Congress, and the Federal Judiciary.
- *Preliminary action:* signing agreements with OPLE to ensure the authority to immediately assume jurisdiction in municipalities identified as electoral risk zones or areas with a high presence of organized crime, without waiting for a state request.

■ States (State Police / Local Prosecutors' Offices):

- *Jurisdiction:* protection of candidates for mayor, city council, and local legislative seats. Investigation of homicides and threats (state jurisdiction).
- *Preliminary Action:* Certification of specialized protection units (bodyguards) vetted for criminal ties.

■ Municipalities:

- *Responsibility:* perimeter security at events; NO assignment of personal bodyguards (due to high risk of infiltration).

■ Coordination Committees: Transform security committees from informational forums into operational command centers. They may include representatives of civil society (observers) with a voice but no vote in sensitive operations to ensure transparency and receive information that may elude the authorities.

■ Work with Political Parties: parties must take responsibility for purging their candidate lists of individuals linked to organized crime and consider creating a fund—without the need for additional funding—to reinforce, where appropriate, protective measures for their candidates in high-risk areas. This involves incorporating screening mechanisms into candidate selection processes to prevent individuals with ties to criminal organizations or a history of such ties from being nominated for elected office.

- This same mechanism should be replicated in judicial elections through safeguards built into the nomination and selection processes with evaluation committees at all levels and for all positions. Given the nature of judicial positions and the importance of ensuring that final candidates have no ties to criminal structures, mechanisms open to the public are proposed so that citizens may file appeals regarding specific profiles, which must be analyzed by the competent authorities.

- For judicial elections, coordination among competent authorities must include members of the evaluation committees at both the federal and state levels.

— Civic Education

Based on the document review, it was found that electoral violence is also fueled by silence and misinformation; therefore, a concurrent objective of any prevention strategy is to raise the political cost of violence through citizen vigilance and the strengthening of social cohesion.

Awareness Campaign

It is important to focus efforts on transforming the cultural perception of violence so as not to normalize or minimize it. To this end, campaigns are needed that denounce it as an electoral crime and distance it from the perception that it has a place in legitimate competition, thereby stripping perpetrators of violence of their “social license.”

This must include all forms of electoral violence, including disinformation, which has become a tool to promote polarization, stigmatize political opponents, and normalize aggression. Therefore, all efforts must be accompanied by a strategy to empower citizens to identify and curb the spread of fake news through questioning and verifying sources.

Early Warning Networks and Citizen Monitoring

The participation of civil society organizations, political groups, neighborhood associations, and other local activist networks is essential for providing information to the relevant authorities. Therefore, mechanisms for centralized information collection and early warning must be created so that authorities have additional informants to identify high-risk areas and spaces in a timely manner.

Spaces are needed to document attacks safely and anonymously (using encrypted apps, incident logs), creating an alert system that notifies authorities and the media before a threat turns into an attack. These records must be verified by trained personnel.

Start of the Electoral Process and Pre-Campaign Phase (or its equivalent)

This is a critical stage of the electoral process because the work of electoral authorities begins based on previously established guidelines and protocols, meaning that the main actions are primarily operational. Simultaneously, this is the stage where candidates become

visible, especially if political campaigns began early, making them more vulnerable. Alerts and protocols cannot wait until individuals have the legal status of candidates.

— Training for Candidates, Pre-Candidates, and Political Actors

Initially, efforts should be made to promote training in personal risk management, ensuring that no candidate goes into the field without basic safety knowledge. Over time, this training should become a mandatory requirement for candidate registration.

— Publication of Protocols and Guidelines

At this stage, it is essential that all key actors involved in an electoral process have firsthand and timely knowledge of existing protocols for addressing and reporting cases of electoral violence. This information must be distributed directly to political parties, candidates, registered pre-candidates, local electoral authorities, the media, evaluation committees, civil society organizations, and local hubs to ensure its widest possible dissemination.

The publication of these protocols should strengthen all civic education strategies to provide tools and information to all stakeholders and minimize inaction in the face of cases of electoral violence.

Campaign Phase

The most important aspect of this phase is to reinforce coordination efforts among the competent authorities, ensure the proper implementation and operation of the protocols, and guarantee that, in the event of electoral violence, investigations are completed and, where appropriate, sanctions are made public.

Post-Election Phase

As has been observed in recent years, violence does not end on election day and often escalates into post-election violence or reprisals. Therefore, the following actions must be considered during this phase:

— Management and Response to Potential Post-Election Conflicts

Due to the potential for latent clashes and conflicts, the following must be ensured:

- **Protection During the Transition:** it is important to understand that protocols do not cease with the conclusion of election day and that security measures must be maintained for candidates—whether winners (until the swearing-in ceremony) or losers (if the risk persists)—during the period for filing challenges and prior to the swearing-in ceremony, if applicable.

- **Judicial Protection:** Given the new logic of judicial elections, it is essential to ensure specific protection for magistrates and judges who will rule on challenges, given the high political tension.
 - In the event of judicial candidate elections, studies must be conducted on the level of vulnerability and pressure to which judicial candidates may be subject, and efforts must be promoted to protect them and defuse sources of aggression.

■ Reparations for Victims

Based on international standards, the State must guarantee:

- **Restitution:** mechanisms to restore political rights to those who were forced to resign or who faced insurmountable obstacles to accessing power.
- **Compensation:** financial compensation for victims (and family members of murdered candidates) to cover funeral, medical, and relocation expenses where applicable.
- **Non-repetition:** evaluation and implementation of legal reforms derived from an analysis of the process's failures, purging of colluding police forces, and strengthening of the autonomy of electoral prosecutors' offices.
 - This must include the permanent political disqualification of convicted perpetrators (Law 8 of 8).

■ Evaluation and Review of Protocols

Conduct an internal and external audit, with the support of international organizations and/or civil society, on the performance of the protocol and the measures adopted throughout the electoral process. The results of these audits must be taken into account to improve all actions aimed at preventing, addressing, and providing redress in the context of electoral violence.

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Proposed Protocol

Below is a proposed protocol consisting of three stages of action, which should take into account the recommendations made in the previous section.

Stage 1: Preparation for Comprehensive Management

— Risk Map:

Before the formal start of the electoral process, a contextual assessment must be conducted by integrating data from the SSPC, INE, Specialized Prosecutor's Office (FISEL), and civil society organizations to identify high-risk municipalities or territorial districts.

- *Indicators to Consider:* Intentional homicides, history of political violence, presence of criminal groups, active territorial disputes, and illicit financing flows.
- *Contextual Assessment:* This evaluates not only whether the candidate or aspiring candidate faces a threat, but also whether they belong to a party, group, or collective that is being systematically targeted in the region (pattern of victimization).
- *Differentiated Judicial Approach:* For judicial elections, the analysis must weigh the candidate's record of rulings. Have they adjudicated organized crime cases? Have they challenged powerful economic interests? This risk profile is technical and requires input from the judiciary itself.

— Competencies and New Network Model:

Taking into account the recommendations regarding the competencies of each authority and level of government, it is necessary to create a network-based response model for activating the protocol.

- **Universal Access:** A request for protection must be able to be filed with the INE, OPL, the Prosecutor's Office, the State Police, or through a secure digital platform. All agencies must function as a one-stop shop and centralize information.
 - This is stipulated in Jurisprudence 1/2023 on urgent protection measures, which empowers various electoral authorities—in addition to the competent one—to issue precautionary measures in the face of imminent risk.

- **Response Triage:** Once the request is received, a rapid screening questionnaire must be administered to determine the urgency of the case:

Risk level	Identification criteria	Response time	Responsible authority	Possible protective measures
EXTREME (Code Red)	Verifiable or imminent direct threat of death, prior attack, kidnapping, presence of an armed group at the residence.	Immediate (0-3 hours)	National Guard / SEDENA / District Attorney's Offices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urgent evacuation from the area. • Shelter in secure facilities. • Assignment of close protection and an armored vehicle. • Chaleco antibalas.
HIGH (Orange)	Credible threats, security incidents involving the team or inner circle, criminal control zone, serious VPMRG.	24-48 hours	State Police (Certified) / National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobile personal protection detail. • Permanent surveillance at home/headquarters. • Georeferenced panic button. • Priority C5 monitoring.
MEDIUM (Yellow)	Unverified threats, online harassment, damage to campaign materials, high perception of insecurity.	72 hours	Municipal / State Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular patrols and signed logbook. • Direct hotline to police command. • Self-defense course and route analysis
LOW (Green)	General environmental risk with no targeted threats.	5 business days	Municipal Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion in neighborhood/electoral safety chat. • Digital self-protection manual.

■ Case Follow-Up:

As mentioned in the triage, measures are not static and must be tailored to each case. Additionally, it is important to remember that activating the protocol alone is not sufficient; it requires follow-up and, when necessary, adjustments to the measures adopted. A timeframe must be established for the mandatory review of measures, which can be biweekly or immediate in the event of new incidents. Civil society plays a vital role in alerting authorities if the measures are insufficient.

To complement this monitoring, it is important that there be a direct channel of communication between the authorities and the individuals receiving protection. This can be through a hotline, digital channels, or personal contact with a security liaison.

Stage 2: Case File Compilation and Investigation

Impunity is the greatest incentive for electoral violence, and this necessitates the professionalization of the response by prosecutors' offices.

— Categorization and Prioritization of crimes:

Prosecutors' offices must classify incidents, for which they can use the taxonomy of the Electoral Violence Investigation Framework (EVIF) :

- 1 **Physical Violence:** Homicides, injuries, kidnappings.
- 2 **Coercive Violence:** Threats, intimidation, burning of ballot boxes.
- 3 **Strategic Violence:** Illicit financing, co-optation of officials.
- 4 **Digital Violence:** Acts of intimidation, coercion, or threats carried out through the use of information technology or digital tools.

— Specialized Investigative Units:

It is recommended that joint task forces (Electoral Prosecutor's Office + Homicide Prosecutor's Office + Financial Intelligence Unit) be created to prevent the fragmentation of the investigation. Often, the homicide or assault of a candidate is investigated as a "common crime" by the local prosecutor's office, overlooking the political motive. The Attorney General's Office (FGR) must proactively exercise its jurisdiction when there are indications of organized crime involvement.

In the adversarial criminal justice system, the complaint must provide the Public Prosecutor's Office with the factual elements to construct a "theory of the case." The complaint must be structured and technical.

The critical elements that must be included are:

- **Factual (Facts):** answer the question "What exactly happened?" A chronological description, without adjectives, focused on observable actions.
- **Evidentiary (Evidence):** answer the question "How do I prove what I'm saying?" Chats, videos, witnesses.
- **Legal (Criminality):** A lawyer must answer the question: What crime do these facts constitute? (Threats, extortion, electoral crimes).

See Annex 6 for a draft of the initial written submission that may form the basis of a formal request to the competent authorities and which, if fully completed, could provide essential information for addressing the case.

— Contextual Evidence in Criminal Investigations:

Prosecutors may include contextual reports (anthropological, sociopolitical) in the case files to demonstrate the systematic nature of the attack and identify the masterminds (political beneficiaries of the violence). At this point, it is worth incorporating TEPJF rulings VI/2023 and VII/2023 to facilitate the submission of evidence that allows authorities to establish violence and coercion without the need for direct evidence that is impossible to obtain (e.g., testimonies in areas controlled by drug cartels), based on an analysis of the environment.

Stage 3: Comprehensive Reparation

Historically, responses to electoral violence have ignored the victims. Based on the standards of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the General Victims' Law, a framework for comprehensive reparation is proposed.

— Restitution:

The objective is to restore the victim to the situation prior to the violation.

- **Restoration of Candidacies:** expedited legal mechanisms to reinstate the registration of candidates who were forced to withdraw under threat.
- **Guarantees of Return:** for candidates internally displaced by violence, ensuring safe conditions for their return to the territory.

— Compensation and Indemnification:

Establishment of a fund to cover immediate medical and funeral expenses, time-limited financial support for dependents of murdered candidates, and costs of relocation and private security measures if the State failed to provide them.

— Satisfaction and Measures:

Acknowledgment of responsibility: public acts in which the State acknowledges failures in protection, commemorative events for victims of political violence, denormalizing death in the democratic process, and a declaration of ineligibility so that perpetrators (convicted of VPMRG or electoral violence) are registered in the National Registry of Sanctioned Persons and are disqualified from holding public office (Law 8 of 2023).

- **Nullification Due to Widespread Violence (Case Law 53/2023):** the measure establishing that physical violence or pressure on polling station officials constitutes grounds for nullification must also be incorporated, which requires preventive monitoring to avoid the collapse of the election and punitive measures to ensure that an environment of impunity is not fostered.

6

Self-Care Guide for Candidates or Aspirants

This section is designed as an operational manual for candidates, based on the best self-protection practices of Colombia's National Protection Unit, as well as various self-protection guides for journalists, human rights defenders, and government staff from various countries in the region. Although public safety is the responsibility of the State, immediate safety depends on a person's ability to manage their environment.

A candidate cannot control the threat (the attacker's intent), but it can reduce its vulnerability and enhance its response capabilities. To this end, the following recommendations are provided:

Step 1: Assess the Environment

Create a "territorial traffic light" system for your pre-campaign or campaign territory:

- **Red Zone:** Total control by an armed/criminal actor.
 - **Action:** Do not enter without a prior security agreement or robust state protection. Pre-campaign or campaign activities there should, if possible, be digital or indirect.
- **Yellow Zone:** Active conflict or movement of illegal groups.
 - **Action:** Enter only during the day, with an advance team and for limited periods.
- **Green Zone:** Areas under broad state control.
 - **Precaution:** Do not let your guard down.

Step 2: Self-Protection Measures in Daily Routines

It is recommended to reduce predictability:

- **Routes and Schedules:** Do not use the same route two days in a row. Vary departure and arrival times; have primary and alternative routes, and designated points of assistance along the way, such as police stations or hospitals.
- **Information Management:** Share your detailed schedule only with your primary circle of trust.
- **Vehicles:** Avoid or reduce the use of conspicuous vehicles, always keep the tank full (at least half full), and always park in a position ready for departure to allow for a quick evacuation.
- **Separate Activities:** Keep work and personal activities separate and avoid excessive exposure of family members. Despite the above, it is important that every family member and immediate team member knows the emergency contact list, which includes direct contacts for public safety authorities.

Step 3: Digital Security and Communications

- **Geolocation:** Do not post your real-time location on social media and/or use the “fake alive” technique (posting photos and videos of the event 1 or 2 hours after leaving the location).
- **Digital Safety:** Keep your personal phone separate from your campaign phone; use encrypted messaging apps (Signal, WhatsApp) with disappearing messages for sensitive topics. Enable two-step verification on all your accounts.
- **Share Responsibly:** Maintain a public account for campaign communication purposes and a private one, strictly limited to family and close friends. Do not post photos that reveal the interior of your home, the make and model of your personal vehicles, or the places you and your family frequent.
- **Additional Measures:** We recommend using a VPN on public Wi-Fi networks, and that the campaign team constantly monitor the network to detect attempts at doxing (disclosure of private information) or hacking. If a digital breach is detected, it must be reported to the platforms immediately.

Step 4: Incident Response Protocol

- **Surveillance:** If you notice you are being followed, do not go home or to the campaign headquarters; instead, go to a pre-identified safe location (military barracks, hospital, busy shopping center).

- **Extortion Calls:** Do not confront the caller; just listen and hang up. Write down the number, time, accent, and demands. Do not deposit money immediately; contact your security liaison or protection team.
- If you encounter explosive devices or suspicious packages (characterized by excessive weight, protruding wires, oil stains, or lack of a sender), do not touch, move, or handle them. Cordon off the area, evacuate, and immediately notify public safety authorities.
- **Armed Attack:** Drop to the ground immediately. Your priority is to minimize your profile and do not run (unless there is immediate cover).

Step 5: Collective Capabilities (Support Networks)

Safety is a collective effort. Establish an Early Warning Network with your team and family:

- Define an emergency code word that means "Imminent danger, evacuate/hide" without needing further explanation.
- Maintain constant monitoring (report your location every hour) with a secure command center.

Step 6: Coordination with Authorities and Reporting

Never stop coordinating with the authorities and ensure special follow-up on your case, including ensuring the dissemination of your report to foster an environment of accountability and reduce incentives for electoral violence. For this, it is important to be clear about the channel or the personal or direct contact through which the individual will communicate with the authorities responsible for providing security.

Appendices

■ Appendix 1.

1 Current constitutional framework mandating the protection of candidates.

Political Constitution of the United Mexican States	
Article	Provision
41, Paragraph 3, Section V, Subsection B, Subparagraph a)	<p>Subsection B. It is the responsibility of the National Electoral Institute, under the terms established by this Constitution and the laws</p> <p>a) For federal and local electoral processes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Electoral training 2. Electoral geography, as well as the design and determination of electoral districts and the division of the territory into electoral sections; 3. The voter registry and voter list; 4. The location of polling stations and the appointment of polling station officials; 5. Rules, guidelines, criteria, and formats regarding preliminary results; opinion polls or surveys; election observation; quick counts; printing of documents and production of election materials; 6. The oversight of the income and expenditures of political parties and candidates; and 7. Any other matters determined by law.
41, paragraph 3, Section V, Subsection C, item 10	<p>Subsection C. In the states, local elections and, where applicable, referendums and recall processes shall be the responsibility of local public bodies under the terms of this Constitution, which shall exercise functions in the following matters:</p> <p>(...)</p> <p>10. All matters not reserved for the National Electoral Institute, and</p> <p>(...)</p>
41, paragraph 3, Section V, Subsection C, paragraph 2, subparagraph c)	<p>In the cases established by law and with the approval of a majority of at least eight votes of the General Council, the National Electoral Institute may:</p> <p>(...)</p> <p>c) To bring to its attention any matter within the jurisdiction of local electoral bodies, when the significance of the matter so warrants or to establish a standard of interpretation.</p>

2 Current legal framework requiring the protection of candidates.

General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures	
Article	Provision
300, paragraph	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To ensure order and guarantee the conduct of election day, the public security forces of the Federation, the states, and the municipalities, or, where applicable, the armed forces, must provide the assistance requested of them by the bodies of the Institute, the Local Public Agencies, and the presidents of the polling station boards, within the scope of their respective jurisdictions, in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures	
Article	Provision
244, paragraph 3	3. The President of the General Council may request from the competent authorities personal security measures for candidates who require them, as well as for candidates for the Presidency of the United Mexican States, from the moment they are recognized as such in accordance with their party's internal mechanisms. The measures adopted by the competent authority shall be reported to the President of the Council.
281	1. The presiding officer may, at any time, request the assistance of public security forces to maintain order at the polling station and ensure the normal conduct of voting, ordering the removal of any person who unduly interferes with or disrupts order. 2. In such cases, the polling station secretary shall record the causes of the disturbance and the measures agreed upon by the chairperson of the polling station board in a special report, which must be signed by the polling station officials and the representatives of the parties accredited to the polling station. If any official or representative refuses to sign, the secretary shall record the refusal.
85, paragraph 1, subsection e	1. The powers of the chairpersons of the polling station boards are as follows: (...) e) To suspend, temporarily or permanently, voting in the event of a disturbance of order or when circumstances or conditions exist that prevent the free exercise of the right to vote, compromise the secrecy of the ballot, or threaten the personal safety of voters, party representatives, or members of the polling station board;

Annex 2. Authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes (FISEL and local specialized prosecutors' offices)

General Law on Electoral Crimes	
Article	Provision
2	For the investigation, prosecution, punishment, and all matters relating to the proceedings concerning the crimes provided for in this Law, the criminal procedural legislation in force in the Federation and in the states, Book One of the Federal Criminal Code, and other national provisions on criminal matters issued by the Congress of the Union shall apply, as appropriate.
4	The Public Prosecutor's Office shall, in all cases, initiate investigations ex officio for the offenses provided for in this Act.
21	The authorities of the Federation shall have jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, and punish the offenses established in this Law when: I. They are committed during a federal electoral process;; II. Any of the rules of jurisdiction provided for in the Organic Law of the Federal Judiciary are applicable; III. SThey are initiated, prepared, or committed abroad, provided that they produce or are intended to produce effects within the national territory, or when they are initiated, prepared, or committed within the national territory, provided that they produce or are intended to produce effects abroad, pursuant to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Federal Criminal Code or the Organic Law of the Federal Judiciary, or IV. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office exercises its power of attraction when any of the following circumstances arise: a. When crimes under state jurisdiction are connected to federal crimes, o b. When the National Electoral Institute exercises its authority to organize a local electoral process, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution..

General Law on Electoral Crimes	
Article	Provision
22	The authorities of the states shall have jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, try, and punish the offenses established in this Law when the Federation does not have jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article.
23	Authorities at all levels of government shall provide the assistance required by the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of this Law and other applicable regulations.
24	<p>The Attorney General's Office, through the Special Prosecutor's Office for Electoral Crimes or the public official to whom such authority is delegated, and the attorney general's offices and prosecutor's offices of the states, within the scope of their jurisdiction based on the provisions of Article 73, Section XXI, Subsection a) of the Constitution and the provisions of this Law, shall coordinate to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Develop coordination and collaboration mechanisms between the Federation, the states, the municipalities, and the political-administrative bodies of their territorial districts, with the aim of strengthening the fight against the crimes provided for in this Law; II. Promote coordination agreements between Federal Government agencies and the states, enabling assistance in the prosecution of electoral crimes; III. Implement a national system for the training, continuing education, professional development, and professionalization of public servants involved in the investigation and prosecution of the crimes provided for in this Act; IV. Establish standardized protocols for the Federation and the states regarding the investigation and prosecution of the crimes provided for in this Law, including the use of law enforcement; V. Facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information among the various law enforcement agencies in the country regarding electoral crimes; VI. Compile and exchange data and crime statistics regarding the offenses set forth in this Act, in accordance with applicable law; VII. Formulate comprehensive, systematic, ongoing, and evaluable policies, as well as programs and strategies to combat the conduct set forth in this Act; VIII. Promote the participation of the community and academic institutions that contribute to the evaluation of policies for the prevention of the conduct provided for in this Act; and IX. Any other duties established by this Act and other applicable provisions.
25	The attorney general's offices and prosecutors' offices of the states shall have specialized units for electoral crimes, equipped with the human, financial, and material resources required for their effective operation.

■ Annex 3. Other Public Security Authorities

General Law of the National Public Security System	
Article	Provision
37	<p>Peace committees are the bodies responsible for executive decision-making and immediate coordination among the institutions of the states in matters of public safety.</p> <p>Local public safety councils are the bodies responsible for establishing public policies of general application within the states, as well as for the strategic and effective coordination of the states' public safety institutions, in accordance with the objectives of the System, the resolutions of the National Council, and national and local public safety strategies.</p> <p>The executive secretaries or their counterparts in the state government shall be the public officials responsible for monitoring the actions taken to comply with the agreements issued by the local council, ensuring the effective coordination of the System.</p>

Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública	
Article	Provision
40	<p>The heads of the executive branches of the states may replicate the functioning of the Federal Cabinet within their respective spheres of competence through peace roundtables.</p> <p>The peace roundtables shall be attended by, including but not limited to, the heads of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. The executive branch of the state, which shall preside over the roundtable; II. The Secretary of Public Safety or equivalent; III. The Secretary of Government or equivalent; IV. The Office of the Attorney General or its equivalent; V. The investigative police or equivalent; VI. Representatives of the armed forces and the National Guard in the region and, where applicable, of the naval zone; VII. The state office of the National Intelligence Center; VIII. The Command and Control Centers; IX. The federal government's welfare programs office in the state, and X. The representative of the Federal Government's Ministry of the Interior, who will serve as the technical secretary. <p>The state judiciary shall be a permanent invitee. Likewise, subject to the agreement of the members of the peace committee, the heads of the state's municipal governments may be summoned for the purpose of coordinating actions and evaluating results, as well as the heads of other institutions.</p> <p>In the case of municipalities, regional peace roundtables may be established comprising two or more municipalities and chaired, on a rotating basis, by the heads of the municipal executive branches that comprise them; these roundtables shall replicate the model of the state peace roundtables and must include representation from both the state executive branch and the public security institutions of the state and the federal government.</p> <p>The peace roundtables shall hold regular sessions on all business days and extraordinary sessions as often as convened by their chair.</p>
41	<p>The peace committees shall have the following objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> I. To review and analyze data related to high-impact crimes, as well as crime trends at the state, municipal, and territorial district levels of México City; II. To analyze high-impact cases that have occurred at the state, municipal, and territorial district levels of México City; III. To coordinate government actions aimed at addressing the causes of violence and building peace; IV. Report on relevant operational actions carried out by the institutions comprising the unit; V. Report on relevant matters regarding the governance of the state and its municipalities or territorial districts, as applicable; VI. Design and implement operational actions; VII. Continuously evaluate the state's public security strategy, as well as the results and operational actions implemented; VIII. Coordinate actions with the Attorney General's Office and the state's judiciary; and IX. Any other actions necessary for its operation.

■ Annex 4. Jurisdictional Authorities

Identification	Provision
Rulings in cases SUP-JRC-166/2021 ⁵ , and related cases, and SUP-JEC-101/2022 ⁶	In both cases, the INE is ordered, within the scope of its authority, to adopt the necessary measures and protocols to establish a national electoral policy regarding the prevention of risk factors for electoral violence, in both federal and local processes; these legal obligations entail: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entering into coordination agreements with public security and electoral authorities. • Generating risk maps with specific actions, which must be made known to the public in the manner deemed most appropriate. • Creating screening mechanisms applicable to candidates. • Developing a protocol to guide the actions of authorities in safeguarding the physical integrity of public servants and voters in areas with organized crime. • Holding forums and consultations with security experts. • Establish a preferential jurisdiction provision so that the INE may assume jurisdiction at any stage over any local or municipal election in which risk factors for violence by criminal groups are identified.
Case Law 1/2023 Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary	Protective measures in urgent cases, such measures may be ordered by an electoral authority other than the one competent to resolve the merits of the complaint, when there is an imminent risk of harm to the life, physical integrity, and freedom of the petitioner ⁷ .
Case Law 53/2023 TEPJF	Physical violence pressure against election board officials or voters as grounds for nullifying votes cast at the polling station (legislation of the State of Jalisco and similar) ⁸ .
Thesis XXIII/2008 TEPJF	Political and electoral propaganda it must not contain expressions that incite violence (legislation of the State of Tamaulipas and similar) ⁹ .
Opinion VI/2023 TEPJF	Contextual evidence or contextual analysis. Nature and scope in complex situations that have a significant impact on electoral matters ¹⁰ .
Thesis VII/2023 TEPJF	Contextual evidence methodology for its analysis in cases of election nullity and/or situations involving evidentiary difficulties ¹¹ .

■ Appendix 5. Risk Levels and Associated Measures

The risk classification determines the security measures provided by the government. This classification is dynamic and may change if circumstances worsen.

⁵ https://www.te.gob.mx/EE/SUP/2021/JRC/166/SUP_2021_JRC_166-1090493.pdf

⁶ <https://www.te.gob.mx/media/pdf/e7deb59e60499be.pdf>

⁷ <https://elecciones2021.te.gob.mx/IUSTEMP/Jurisprudencia%20I-2023.pdf>

⁸ <https://mexico.justia.com/federales/jurisprudencias-tesis/tribunal-electoral/jurisprudencia-53-2002/>

⁹ <https://mexico.justia.com/federales/jurisprudencias-tesis/tribunal-electoral/tesis-xxiii-2008/>

¹⁰ <https://elecciones2021.te.gob.mx/IUSTEMP/Tesis%20VI-2023.pdf>

¹¹ <http://www.teqroo.org.mx/np9/Tesis/TEPJF/2023/VII.pdf>

Risk Level	Scenario Profile	Protective Measures	Enforcing Authority
HIGH	Direct and credible threat of death; previous attacks; area under dominant criminal control; high-profile candidates (governors, ministers).	Armored vehicle (provided by SEDENA/GN or the candidate). Dedicated escort unit (3-4 personnel + official vehicle). 24/7 security at home and while traveling.	SEDENA / National Guard
MEDIUM	Unverified threats, but in a dangerous context; minor security incidents; areas of active criminal conflict.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mobile escort patrol (escort during campaign travel). Stationary surveillance at public events. Periodic monitoring at residence. 	National Guard / State Police (in coordination)
LOW	Generalized contextual risk; no specific direct threats.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Follow-up log (periodic calls). Direct liaison with regional command. Random patrols at the field headquarters. 	SSPC / Municipal or State Police

■ Appendix 6. Proposed key elements for the initial report

— Header and Authority

Address the authority to whom you are submitting the form, noting the chain of command.

— Complainant's information and request for confidentiality

Provide name and position.

Request, based on the National Code of Criminal Procedure (CNPP), **that personal information be kept confidential** if there is a well-founded fear of retaliation. Although the candidate's name is public, their home address and personal phone number must be kept confidential in a sealed envelope.

— Detailed account

Describe the facts by answering the key questions of criminal investigation:

- Time
- Place
- Method
- Identification

■ Evidence and chain of custody

These may include:

Text messages/WhatsApp: Initially, a printed or digital screenshot may be sufficient. Subsequently, a "judicial inspection of the device" may be required, or a notarized affidavit or statement from the Electoral Office certifying that the message exists on the phone.

Videos: These may be submitted on a digital medium (USB) or in digital format when the complaint is filed electronically, ensuring that they have not been edited.

■ Precautionary measures

Possible measures that may be requested include:

- Restraining order against aggressors (if identified).
- Police surveillance at the residence.
- Immediate assistance upon request.

These measures from the Public Prosecutor's Office should be independent of the federal protection provided by the INE-SSPC program and can be obtained more quickly at the local level.

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